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STEVEN FARRAM
The PKI in West Timor and 
Nusa Tenggara Timur
1965 and beyond
This article examines the aftermath in West Timor, and elsewhere in the prov-
ince of Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT), of the so-called coup attempt made in 
Jakarta, Indonesia, on the evening of 30 September-1 October 1965, which 
came to be known by the acronym G30S (Gerakan 30 September; 30 Septem-
ber Movement). The ‘coup’, which resulted in the deaths of six army generals, 
amongst others, was blamed on the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Indone-
sian Communist Party). The PKI was subsequently banned and many of its 
members and sympathizers died as the result of extra-judicial killings, often 
carried out or organized by the army. These killings were most widespread in 
Java and Bali, the main centres of PKI activity, but occurred in the outer-island 
provinces as well, including NTT.
What follows is a brief assessment of the PKI’s strength and support 
in NTT in 1965; the initial response to G30S in NTT; the first actions taken 
against the PKI; and descriptions of events later cited as examples of G30S 
plans for NTT. This is followed by some analysis of the killings that occurred 
in NTT after G30S, including consideration of numbers killed; who carried 
out the killings; those who were targeted; and the fate of those captured, but 
not executed. Consideration is also given to the ongoing effects of accusations 
of PKI membership in NTT and how the party has been viewed in the prov-
ince in more recent times. First, however, it is important to say something 
about the sources used to write this article.
A note on the sources 
Many of the published Indonesian sources about G30S were produced by the 
army or the New Order government led by General Soeharto, which came to 
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power following the events of 1965. Extra-judicial killings, arbitrary imprison-
ment, and persecution of individuals who have committed no crime apart from 
supporting an ideology different to that of their opponents are not normally 
matters recorded faithfully by those who have benefitted from those acts and 
are largely seen as responsible for them. New Order propaganda sought to por-
tray members of the PKI as criminals and traitors whose vile acts so incensed 
the people that they were driven to attempt to exterminate them. The govern-
ment and the army, on the other hand, are portrayed as the saviours of the na-
tion who stepped in and stopped the slaughter by assuring the people that they 
would prevent the PKI from ever again obtaining a position of power or influ-
ence. In the process, the role of the New Order and the army in promoting and 
carrying out the killings is glossed over. However, as the victims of the violence 
have had little opportunity to set the story straight the histories produced by 
the New Order are some of the few sources available. Some of the information 
used in this article has been gained from government and military sources and 
must be treated with caution and where appropriate this is noted in the text.
A few Western press reports that are used appear to be second-hand 
accounts gathered by journalists based in Jakarta. In some cases the reports 
are corroborated by other sources, but in other cases not and thus must also be 
approached with some doubt. Most of the first-hand accounts used to inform 
the article are taken from interviews done by the author and others with 
people living in NTT. It is only in recent times that many people have been 
prepared to talk about the events following G30S and that gives these sources 
a special value. Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that these testimonies 
were made decades after the events they describe and memory can be faulty. 
On the other hand, the author has no reason to believe that any of the testimo-
nies used were fabricated. The main note of caution is in relation to events that 
the interviewees ‘heard about’ rather than experienced directly. In some cases 
this information appears to be little more than recycled New Order anti-PKI 
propaganda. Even this has some value, however, in supplying a picture of the 
extent of that propaganda and people’s willingness to believe it. 
All sources must be viewed critically and the special circumstances per-
taining in the present study mean that the veracity of some sources available 
must be considered doubtful. However, by comparing the varying sources 
that do exist a more complete picture can be obtained than was previously 
available of what did happen in West Timor and NTT following G30S.
The extent of PKI support in NTT in 1965
The PKI began as a socialist organization in Java in 1914, taking on the name 
Partai Komunis Indonesia in 1924. In that same year Dutch officials in West 
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Timor reported communist activity in their area. From its earliest days, until 
its demise following G30S, the PKI succeeded in appealing to a wide variety 
of people in NTT and was able to convince them that it could respond to their 
particular needs, whether they were Christians, Muslims, animists, university 
lecturers, or illiterate farmers.1 
It is impossible to know the exact level of support the PKI enjoyed in NTT 
at the time of the 1965 Jakarta ‘coup’.2 Nevertheless, it is known that the party 
and its affiliated organizations had expanded their membership in the region 
markedly in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The PKI-affiliated Barisan Tani 
Indonesia (BTI, Indonesian Farmers’ Front), for example, is reported to have 
experienced a fourteen per cent growth in membership between 1957 and 
1959, largely in the regions of Aceh, Bali, West Timor, and the NTT islands of 
Flores and Sumba (Hindley 1966:166). In the worsening economic situation of 
the early 1960s the PKI was able to gain support in rural West Timor through 
offers of aid and its campaign for land reform. The governor of NTT follow-
ing G30S, Brigadier General El Tari, reports that in 1960 the BTI established 
branches in Kupang, the capital of West Timor, the town SoE, the district 
Timor Tengah Utara (TTU, North Central Timor), and also on Alor Island. 
By 1963 the BTI reportedly had 25,073 members in the district Timor Tengah 
Selatan (South Central Timor), 189 in TTU, 16,166 in Belu district, and 4,000 
in Kupang. Tari (1972:253-4, 263) gives no indication of where he got this 
information, but as he names the committee members of each branch, it seems 
likely they did exist. The issue of membership is more difficult to establish, 
however, and it may be, as is discussed later on, that the figures given are 
based on the number of people who received assistance from the BTI and who 
otherwise had no real connection with it. Unless Tari simply invented the 
figures, they are still a useful guide to BTI activities, if not BTI membership. 
Some Protestant ministers based in West Timor’s poor rural districts could 
relate to PKI demands for social justice and in urban areas a number of NTT’s 
best educated Christians – university lecturers and schoolteachers – were 
sympathetic to the PKI, mainly as a result of President Soekarno’s promotion 
of the concept Nasionalisme Agama Komunisme (NASAKOM, Nationalism 
Religion Communism). While senior officials of the major Protestant church 
in NTT, Gereja Masehi Injili Timor (GMIT, Timor Evangelical Christian 
Church), were opposed to this flirtation with the PKI, many Christians 
saw Soekarno as the Church’s protector and recognized that he had been 
instrumental in preventing Indonesia from becoming an Islamic state; thus, 
if Soekarno supported NASAKOM, they believed it must be in the national 
1 For more on early PKI history in NTT, see Farram 2002.
2 There was support for G30S in Central Java also, but this soon collapsed with the news that 
the Jakarta ‘coup’ had failed (Ricklefs 1990:270).
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interest (Webb 1986:97-9).
The PKI convinced many in NTT that it was a Christian-friendly organiza-
tion, but that did not prevent it seeking adherents from non-Christian groups, 
most notably the animists who constructed the majority of the population in 
1965. In West Timor’s Belu district and on Solor Island cargo cult-type move-
ments associated with the PKI attracted many followers (Webb 1986:101-2, 
106-7; Schaper 1984). On Sumba the PKI enjoyed an increase in its support 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s among poor landless farmers by promising 
to remove them from debt slavery and providing them land from the estates 
of the traditional elites (Kuipers 1998:86). In West Timor’s Amanuban district 
the Nabuasa clan sought PKI support to reclaim its traditional authority from 
the ruling Nope clan; whereas elsewhere, such as in Amarasi, the PKI had 
taken a decidedly anti-feudal stance. The Nabuasa clan also sought PKI sup-
port against local Christians who opposed the traditional animist practices of 
its members (McWilliam 1999:135).
By the end of 1957 the PKI-affiliated Gerakan Wanita Indonesia (Gerwani, 
Indonesian Women’s Movement) was said to have 2,260 members in the 
province of Nusa Tenggara (Hindley 1966:206), but in 1958 that province was 
divided into three as Bali, Nusa Tenggara Barat (West Nusa Tenggara; compris-
ing Lombok, Sumbawa, and other islands), and Nusa Tenggara Timur (East 
Nusa Tenggara; comprising West Timor, Flores, Sumba and other islands), so it 
is difficult to know where the members were based. El Tari (1972:264) reports 
that Gerwani was active in NTT in the early 1960s, and along with other PKI-
affiliated organizations, such as Pemuda Rakyat (People’s Youth), Sentral 
Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (SOBSI, All-Indonesia Central Labour 
Organization), and Serikat Pegawai Daerah (SEPDA, District Government 
Officials’ Association), tried to create a negative feeling towards Governor W.J. 
Lalamentik. Tari gives no indication of the membership of these groups and 
while other evidence supports his claim that they did exist in NTT it is likely 
that membership for some was quite small. As well as members of these offi-
cial organizations there were an unknown number of unofficial PKI associates 
and sympathizers, such as the people who joined the PKI-supported cargo-
cult movements in Belu and Solor, as mentioned earlier.
The PKI reportedly gained some high-level local government officials 
as sympathizers in NTT also, including the head of the Department of 
Information,3 R. Amir Tjiptoprawiro, who was head of the government radio 
station Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI), and army commander Lieutenant 
Colonel Soetarmadji (Gerakan 1996:116). If we consider parliamentary repre-
3 Interview with Andreas Yohannes, SoE, 26 June 2000. Yohannes said that the head of the De-
partment of Information and Lieutenant Colonel Soetarmadji were members of the PKI, but his 
statement was most likely based on rumours heard either before or after G30S.
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sentation, the PKI would appear to have had considerable support in NTT as 
by 1961 the NTT head of the PKI, Thobias (As) Paulus Rissi, had been elected 
to the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly), as 
one of three NTT representatives.4 In 1959 none of the 23 members of NTT’s 
local parliament were connected to the PKI, but by 1965 there were 13 PKI 
representatives in the local parliament, and one each from SOBSI and the 
BTI. However, all were relieved of their parliamentary duties shortly after 30 
September 1965 (Tari 1972:106, 109).
The immediate response in NTT to G30S
When the Udayana Territorial Military Commander in Bali, Brigadier General 
Sjafiuddin, first heard of G30S over the radio he instructed his people to con-
tinue working as usual and to ‘intensify the unity and integrity between the 
Armed Forces and the strength of the NASAKOM-based progressive, revo-
lutionary people’.5 About a week later, on 9 October 1965, the Commander 
seemed to have had a clearer notion of the meaning of the Jakarta events when 
he instructed that all members of the military and civil services in his terri-
tory were strictly prohibited from being involved in the movement known 
as ‘G.30.S.’6 Sjafiuddin, a committed follower of President Soekarno, had ini-
tially been slow to take action against the PKI and ultimately was replaced in 
June 1966 (Robinson 1998:232, 287-9).
Local PKI elements in NTT are said to have taken some action following 
G30S. It is claimed in the Department of Information’s book that on 1 October 
1965 As Rissi, the NTT PKI Secretary, passed on his concept of the NTT 
Revolutionary Council to Lieutenant Colonel Soetarmadji (Gerakan 1996:115-
6). According to the Udayana history, Soetarmadji raised the idea of forming 
Revolutionary Councils, from village to provincial level, with the local armed 
forces leadership, but the idea was rejected. The government radio station, 
RRI, under R. Amir Tjiptoprawiro, is also named for broadcasting continu-
ously from 1 October to 3 October the Order of the Day made on 1 October by 
Omar Dani, commander of the Angkatan Udara Republik Indonesia (AURI, 
Indonesian Air Force), in which he referred favourably to G30S as a move-
ment aimed at protecting the Indonesian Revolution and President Soekarno 
from subversive elements associated with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) of the United States of America. RRI is also said to have broadcast 
a separate AURI statement to do with the formation of the Revolutionary 
4 Letter from Australian Consulate, Dili, Portuguese Timor, 2-2-1961, in: National Australian 
Archives (NAA), 1838/280, 3038/2/2/2.
5 ‘Pengumuman Pangdam XVI/Udayana’, in Dinuth 1997:368.
6 ‘Instruksi Pangdam XVI Udayana’, in Dinuth 1997:377.
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Council.7 
The coverage offered by RRI must have been confusing for listeners, but 
a privileged few in NTT had access to shortwave radio and kept abreast of 
events in Jakarta by listening to Radio Australia, which many considered to be 
a more reliable source of information.8 However, the majority of NTT people, 
including PKI members, had little access to radio and knew next to nothing of 
what had been happening. For example, Father Simon Schaper lived in West 
Timor’s south Belu district for many years and was well acquainted with the 
local PKI leaders and functionaries. Schaper kept track of events in Jakarta by 
listening to Radio Australia, but was surprised that a few days after the ‘coup’ 
the local communists carried on with their business as normal and continued 
to give him their casual greetings. The men were finally arrested and Schaper 
(1984:61) concluded that they must have been totally unaware of what had 
happened in Jakarta.
The first actions taken against the PKI in NTT
As already noted, New Order sources portray the PKI as an organization de-
spised by the common people who were bent on eliminating it and it was only 
through the calm actions of the army that order was restored. Thus we read 
in the Udayana history that the realization that the PKI was behind the Ja-
karta ‘coup’ unleashed a strong desire amongst ‘the people’ to destroy the PKI 
and all its associated organizations. In response, the Territorial Military Com-
mander issued an order on 3 November 1965 halting all activities of the PKI 
and its associates in his territory. This was not enough for ‘the people’, howev-
er, and in Denpasar, Bali, on 7 December they attacked shops, destroyed prop-
erty, and killed people connected to the PKI. The violence soon spread despite 
an order issued that same day prohibiting people taking the law into their 
own hands. The violence had subsided by 1 January 1966, by which time the 
‘eradication’ of the PKI was being carried out in ‘orderly’ fashion by the army. 
By then about 30,000 people had already been killed in Bali (ABRI 1999:94-5). 
This account is most misleading as it suggests the killings were spontaneous 
affairs carried out by ‘the people’ and not the army. Most evidence, however, 
7 ABRI 1999:93. Omar Dani’s 1 October Order of the Day has been reproduced in several sourc-
es, but the other document referred to in the ABRI book, AURI statement number 5/D27/65, 1 
October 1965, has not been found by the author. However, a statement issued by Omar Dani on 
2 October 1965, number 5/207/65, has been reproduced in various sources concerning G30S. It 
states that AURI is not involved in G30S; that AURI agrees with all efforts to ‘clean out’ the instru-
ments of the revolution in accordance with the directions of the Great Leader of the Revolution 
(Soekarno); and that AURI knows nothing about the Revolutionary Council or the composition 
of its personnel (Dinuth 1997:70; Gerakan 1996: Lampiran 10).
8 Interview with Maria Patty-Noach, Kupang, 30 June 2000; Schaper 1984:61.
 The PKI in West Timor and Nusa Tenggara Timur 387
points to the killings having been carried out or directed by the military, with 
anti-PKI groups encouraged to rid themselves of their enemies with the army 
supplying transport, communications, and weapons (Robinson 1998:295-9).
In NTT, in the meantime, El Tari reports that ‘the people’ began taking 
‘spontaneous action’ on 28 October 1965. This included pelting the houses of 
As Rissi and other PKI members with stones. All signs and placards in Kupang 
with the initials PKI were torn down; and a number of PKI members were 
captured by local youths, although what they did with them is not recorded. 
Further to this, on 20 November 1965 and again on 17 January 1966, mass meet-
ings were held in Kupang attended by up to 10,000 people, with representa-
tives of all the non-communist parties present, who demanded the dissolution 
of the PKI and all its associated organizations. The PKI, however, is alleged to 
have ‘voluntarily’ disbanded itself on 11 January 1966 (Tari 1972:284-5, 287). As 
with the Department of Information’s version of events in Bali, Tari’s account 
cannot be accepted at face value. It is very possible that the events he describes 
did take place, but it is most likely that they were instigated and carried out by 
the army or anti-PKI groups encouraged by the military. This is quite unlike the 
spontaneous acts of an undifferentiated mass known as ‘the people’.
Concurrent with the events just related, the army and police began arrest-
ing PKI members throughout NTT. Some of the most high-profile ones, such 
as Rissi, Soetarmadji, and the head of the Department of Information, were 
arrested and taken away to Java or Bali. Most of these people were never 
heard of again, although it is said that Rissi returned to Kupang in the 1990s.9 
According to one informant, Rissi received lenient treatment because of fam-
ily connections high up in the military.10 Some lesser PKI activists are said 
to have escaped death or imprisonment by fleeing NTT into neighbouring 
Portuguese Timor.11
Events later cited as proof of G30S plans for West Timor
There is a widespread belief in West Timor that the PKI planned many killings 
associated with G30S, but on close examination many of the stories on which 
this belief is based appear highly flawed. In SoE, communists are supposed 
to have dug graves near a local landmark, the Beatrix Tree (planted in 1938 
to commemorate the birth of Princess Beatrix of the Netherlands), in which 
9 Interviews with Andreas Yohannes, SoE, 26 June 2000; Maria Patty-Noach, Kupang 30 June 
2000; name withheld, Kupang, 7 July and 4 November 2000; and former senior GMIT synod 
member, name withheld by request, Kupang, 3 November 2000. 
10 Interviews with name withheld, Kupang, 7 July and 4 November 2000.
11 Interview with Maria Patty-Noach, Kupang, 30 June 2000. This is by no means a solitary 
opinion and has been heard by the author many times in West Timor.
388 Steven Farram
to bury the bupati (regent) and other government officials.12 In Kupang com-
munists are also supposed to have dug graves to bury heads of government 
departments and others.13 In the aftermath of G30S various ‘blacklists’ were 
allegedly discovered in Kupang with the names of church leaders and oth-
ers opposed to the PKI who were to have been liquidated. Their bodies were 
to have been disposed of in the Oesapa district in an open drain leading to 
the sea.14 While it is possible that ‘blacklists’ were discovered post-G30S they 
could just as easily have been fabricated by the army. The case of pre-prepared 
graves, on the other hand, is most unlikely as they would surely have been 
discovered. The persistence of these rumours and their apparent acceptance 
as truth is an indication of the persuasiveness of New Order propaganda in 
the climate of fear that existed in the aftermath of G30S in NTT. It is also prob-
ably no coincidence that these rumours appear to be most readily accepted 
as truth by non-communist former government officials and other prominent 
members of the community who felt threatened by the PKI.
Maria Patty-Noach, who in 1965 was a young lecturer at the Kupang 
state university, recalled that there was an ‘air-raid practice’ in Kupang just 
before the ‘coup’ where a number of Christian leaders and non-communist 
government officials were taken out of town. They returned home safely, but 
the following day they heard via Radio Australia of the ‘coup’ in Jakarta. 
Patty-Noach surmises that these people were to have been killed, but that for 
some reason the order never came through and they were released.15 John 
Hughes (1967:142-3) recorded a similar story of non-communist officials and 
their spouses being gathered outside Kupang for a ‘special briefing’, but were 
returned unharmed when local army units refused to align themselves with 
the communist plotters. The similarities in these two accounts suggest that 
an event of the kind described did occur, but without further information the 
claim that the plan had been to kill those who attended appears to be mere 
speculation after the event.
The Indonesian Department of Information in its book concerning G30S 
reports that the PKI Central Committee in Jakarta sent one of its members, 
Sardjono, to Kupang in mid-September 1965 with instructions for the NTT 
PKI to prepare a Dewan Revolusi (Revolutionary Council) to replace the 
existing heads of government. This is reported to have been done at a meet-
ing on 27 September, where it was also decided how to eliminate the existing 
officials and troublesome alim ulama (religious scholars) (Gerakan 1996:91). 
12 Interview with Pae Nope, SoE, 26 June 2000. Nope is the youngest son of the then bupati, 
Koesa Nope, who was also the last officially-recognized raja of the kingdom of Amanuban.
13 Interview with Andreas Yohannes, SoE, 26 June 2000.
14 Brookes 1977:85-6; interview with former senior GMIT synod member, name withheld by 
request, Kupang, 3 November 2000.
15 Interview with Maria Patty-Noach, Kupang, 30 June 2000.
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The use of the Islamic term alim ulama is curious as the main religious oppo-
sition to the PKI in NTT came from members of the Protestant and Catholic 
churches, not from the minority Islamic community. Without documentary 
proof it is impossible to know whether a Dewan Revolusi was prepared or 
even planned for NTT, but the reference to alim ulama in the Department of 
Information’s book suggests that its authors had little understanding of the 
situation in NTT in 1965.
In an official history of the Udayana military command (based in Bali, 
but which also controls NTT) it is stated that the PKI had planned to kill the 
Minister of Defence, General Achmad Yani, during his visit to Kupang in 
September 1965, but that this ‘evil plan’ was foiled by the vigilant security 
provided by the army (ABRI 1999:92). El Tari, a senior army officer based in 
NTT at the time and later the governor of the province, included in his official 
memoir a photograph of General Yani with Lieutenant Colonel Soetarmadji, 
taken at Kupang on 28 September 1965; the caption to the photograph states 
that Yani was to have been killed by the PKI and that Soetarmadji was part 
of the plot.16 A rumour later circulated in Kupang that an attempt had been 
made to kill Yani with a poisoned apple, but that the general had rejected the 
fruit, stating that he had been taught that apples were only for sick people.17 
Yani was among those who died during the ‘coup’ in Jakarta two days later, 
but if he had been killed in Kupang it would surely have had an enormous 
influence on the course of events and highly disrupted any plans being made 
by the PKI in the capital. The alleged plot to kill Yani in Kupang thus appears 
to be no more than post-G30S propaganda, while the rumour of the poisoned 
apple is one of the least believable of such tales.
The killings – how many died, by what means, and where they were buried
The number of people who died in NTT as a result of killings following G30S 
is unknown. All sources agree that the figure is at least in the hundreds, while 
some put it at 2,000 or higher.18 R.A.F. Paul Webb (1986:98-9) was informed 
that civilian ‘killer squads’ similar to those that had operated in Java and Bali 
were also active in West Timor. While co-ordinated by the army, it appears 
that members of Ansor, the youth wing of Nahdlatul Ulama (the largest Is-
16 Tari 1972: photograph between pp. 32 and 33.
17 Interview with former senior GMIT synod member, name withheld by request, Kupang, 3 
November 2000.
18 Interviews with Andreas Yohannes, SoE, 6 June 2000; Minggus Ratukore, Kupang, 7 July 
2000; and name withheld, Kupang, 7 July and 4 November 2000; Cooley 1976:347; Hiorth 1985:18. 
See also Aritonang and Steenbrink 2008:253-4; the section dealing with the PKI was written by 
John Prior with Eduard Jebarus.
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lamic organization in Indonesia), and Islamic, Protestant and Catholic stu-
dent groups were actively involved in organizing and carrying out killings in 
NTT.19 El Tari (1972:280) reports that the PKI in NTT was ‘wiped out’, ‘down 
to the village level’, by the government and the army with the help of the peo-
ple. Most sources concur that if the army was directly responsible the victims 
were usually shot; if the killings were carried out under army instruction the 
people were most often decapitated with machetes, an item almost habitually 
carried by most rural men of the region.20
In most cases arrests seem to have been followed almost immediately 
with extra-judicial killings. The wife of the head of the Nunhila PKI branch 
in Kupang recalls her husband being arrested and taken to the old gaol 
near the Kupang waterfront. The 30 or 40 members of his branch were also 
arrested, and none were ever seen again.21 In some cases trials were held, 
but one non-communist NTT parliamentarian from the time believes that no 
more than a dozen PKI members were convicted and given prison sentences; 
the rest were simply executed.22 Three judges were sent to the small south 
Belu town of Betun where 30 PKI suspects were held captive for months in 
makeshift cells pending trial; some went mad in the interim. One young PKI 
member ordered to report to the judges committed suicide by plunging a 
machete into his stomach. The suspects were periodically released to collect 
provisions from their homes, but if one of the prisoners absconded one of his 
fellow prisoners was executed. Father Schaper witnessed a group of prison-
ers holding the head of a man decapitated as the result of one of the other 
prisoners attempting to escape. The escapee was soon caught and executed 
also. Schaper was surprised to learn that four of the detainees – two men and 
two women – were acquitted by the judges but by then scores of other PKI 
suspects in the district had met their deaths and were buried in mass graves 
in Webua, in the forest between Lalian and Atambua, and elsewhere.23
Judges were also appointed in Sumba, with one appearing in west Sumba 
in mid-1966. As a result of his deliberations six PKI leaders were executed on a 
beach in Memboro in north Sumba and a further 13 on a beach in the south at 
Rua. Why the executions took place on beaches or how they were carried out is 
not known (Kuipers 1998:86-7). In central Sumba a judge ordered suspects to be 
19 Leaders of these student and youth groups today hold senior positions in NTT business, the 
media, and politics. Personal communication from Gerry van Klinken, 22 July 2009, based on 
notes from his field trip to NTT, June 2009. I thank Gerry for allowing me to use this information.
20 Interviews with Andreas Yohannes, SoE, 6 June 2000; and Minggus Ratukore, Kupang, 7 July 
2000. See also Webb 1986:103, 107; Aritonang and Steenbrink 2008:254.
21 Interviews with name withheld, Kupang, 7 July and 4 November 2000.
22 Interview with Minggus Ratukore, Kupang, 7 July 2000.
23 Schaper 1984:55-7, 63. Schaper relates that the execution of prisoners in response to the escape 
of one of their fellow prisoners was also practised by the Japanese when he was interned by them 
during the Second World War.
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rounded up, loaded on a truck, and driven through neighbouring villages with 
an invitation for local people to physically assault them. A Dutch Protestant 
pastor and a Dutch Catholic priest were incensed by the lack of justice in these 
cases, as the men had undergone no trials and no evidence had been offered 
against them; they had been merely presumed guilty. The two Dutch preachers 
condemned this practice from their respective pulpits and it was soon discon-
tinued. Whether any lives were saved as a result is unknown, but at least 100 
communists or suspected communists are thought to have perished on Sumba 
under orders of the local military (Webb 1986:107-8).
The wife of the Nunhila PKI branch head is certain her husband and his 
colleagues were executed, but she has no idea where or when this occurred, 
or what happened to their bodies afterwards. There are, however, believed to 
be numerous mass graves in West Timor containing the remains of victims 
of the post-G30S killings. In Kupang and SoE, for example, PKI members 
are said to have been shot and buried in the graves they had previously dug 
to bury their own intended victims.24 It is almost certain the burial places 
exist, but as already noted it is highly unlikely that any PKI members dug 
graves before G30S in NTT; the accounts sound more like rumours that were 
fabricated afterwards to justify the executions. Two of the burial places in 
Kupang are said to be Tanah Merah and Batuplat, and there are said to be a 
number of graves outside the town as well.25 Allen K. Wilson (1992:42-3, 49), 
an Australian travelling in West Timor in the early 1970s, was given a lift to 
Kupang from Kefamenanu by a senior government official who pointed out 
to him a spot near Kupang that he said was the mass grave of hundreds of 
people killed following G30S.
One of the most detailed accounts of a mass grave in NTT was collected by 
Gerry van Klinken in June 2009. He was shown a place near Buraen in West 
Timor where 33 people are said to be buried in two locations. It is said that 
300 people had been captured and were held at Baun, but that Raja Victor 
Koroh of Amarasi managed to get most freed; otherwise it seems the raja 
worked closely with the military in the killings. The rest of the detainees were 
brought to the place near Buraen, which is a swamp in the middle of a for-
est. Either the military from Kupang carried out the killings or they ordered 
locals from the area to do it. The killings took place sometime between 
February and April 1966. It is said that for a long time people passing the site 
experienced strange things. If people were carrying meat to the market, for 
example, and went past this place they would find they could not walk any 
further, but if they cut off a bit of meat and threw it in the forest they could 
continue. For many years later people left sirih pinang (the material used 
24 Interviews with Andreas Yohannes, SoE, 26 June 2000; and Pae Nope, SoE, 26 June 2000.
25 Interviews with Pae Nope, SoE, 26 June 2000; Maria Patty-Noach, Kupang, 30 June 2000; and 
Benyamin Sahetapy Engel, Kupang, 2 November 2000.
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when chewing betel) tied up in the trees as an offering to the spirits of those 
killed. Until today truck drivers passing the site blow their horns otherwise 
their trucks will ‘die’. Truck drivers passing a mass grave about 40 kilometres 
west of Ende in Flores follow the same practice.26
Western journalists based in Jakarta who appear to have collected their 
material from others who had travelled to eastern Indonesia reported that the 
army and police organized nightly executions in Kupang and invited local 
citizens to witness them and take part. A Western visitor was also invited 
to attend, and was told that participation was obligatory so that all who 
witnessed the killings were involved in some way. It was further reported 
that men had been killed along with wives and children in order to decrease 
the chances for revenge (King 1966; Sulzberger 1966). This latter report may 
have referred to a single incident, but the killing of family members was also 
reported by a witness from the island of Rote, and an account of a massacre in 
Maumere on Flores refers to men, women and children hacked to death and 
dumped in mass graves.27 Patty-Noach says that members of non-communist 
political parties, such as the Partai Kristen Indonesia (Parkindo, Indonesian 
Christian Party), were ordered to attend the executions, which was against 
their will.28 Heads of government departments were also ordered to wit-
ness the killings. Andreas Yohannes, who at the time was head of the Social 
Department, did not wish to take part, so he sent a representative in his offi-
cial jeep. When the jeep was driven back its interior was covered in blood. 
Yohannes asked what had happened and was told that one of the prisoners 
had tried to escape, was shot, and then transported to the burial site in the 
jeep. Yohannes heard that some of those who were shot were not yet dead 
when they were buried.29
On Rote Island a young man who had lived in the Netherlands for many 
years returned to visit his family in September 1965. His timing could not 
have been worse. In November 1965 the army was given a ‘blacklist’ of com-
munists by the police and proceeded to round them up. This included many 
of the local teachers, several of whom were members of the young man’s 
family. The man knew of about 50 communists and their families who were 
killed and heard the executions, carried out with machine guns, take place 
at the port Pelabuhan Baru. He later saw the bodies, which were left to be 
carried away by the sea. He also heard that the army had been given a quota 
from Jakarta, but the list supplied by the police was too short, so they simply 
rounded up some Chinese merchants, killed them, and added their names to 
26 Personal communication from Gerry van Klinken, 22 July 2009.
27 Name withheld, interviewed by Rob Goodfellow, Kupang, June 1997 (thanks to Rob for this 
information); Aritonang and Steenbrink 2008:254.
28 Interview with Maria Patty-Noach, Kupang, 30 June 2000.
29 Interview with Andreas Yohannes, SoE, 26 June 2000.
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the list.30
In Ende town on Flores it seems that many suspected communists were 
arrested, as it was reported that they were brought out of prison daily, 20 at 
a time, and beheaded. Sometimes a head was left displayed in the town’s 
central square (Sulzberger 1966; King 1966). Webb (1986:104-5) was told of 
such an event that occurred in Ende in November 1966; he was also told of a 
suspected communist being burnt at the stake. The wife of the Nunhila PKI 
branch head had also heard the story of an alleged communist in Flores being 
tied to a tree and set on fire.31 According to information gathered by Gerry 
van Klinken this event took place at Tanjung near Ende. The man executed 
was John Dimu, a well-known, aggressively pro-PKI figure. The death by 
burning was advertised by the military the day before and many people 
gathered to witness the event. Dimu was dragged to the site behind a truck, 
so he was in very bad condition before the execution. A pile of rubber tyres 
was soaked in petrol and Dimu was forced to stand in the middle of the pile 
before the tyres were set on fire. Several witnesses claim that Dimu stood with 
his arms stretched sideways, ‘like Christ’, as he burnt to death. This killing 
was said to have been organized by the police and Ansor.32
Webb (1986:104-5) also reports the story of the ‘fanatical Muslim’ Javanese 
army commander in Ende who ordered young Catholics to participate in 
the slaughter of known or suspected communists. The Timorese Archbishop 
Gabriel Manek of Ende forbade Catholic participation in the strongest terms 
and the army commander did not renew his order. The ‘fanatical Muslim’ 
charge was also heard in West Timor and the killings there, which continued 
throughout 1966 and well into 1967, are said to have only come to a halt after 
repeated complaints by Parkindo that those being killed were not commu-
nists, but Christians.33
Manek and a few other members of the Catholic clergy took a strong stand 
against the killings in Flores and this appears to have diminished the slaugh-
ter, but in many areas the clergy ‘stood aside as silent bystanders’ (Aritonang 
and Steenbrink 2008:255). In Maumere, Catholic youth leaders were intimi-
dated by the military into taking part in an orchestrated campaign of kill-
ings between February and May 1966. In some cases whole villages, such as 
Keut, were almost totally wiped out, with men, women, and children hacked 
to death and buried in mass graves in a mission coconut plantation near 
Wairklau. Between 800 and 2,000 people are said to have perished at this time, 
nearly all baptized Catholics. Local Protestants and Muslims were forced to 
participate in digging graves and other tasks, so that all were implicated and 
30 Name withheld, interviewed by Rob Goodfellow, Kupang, June 1997. 
31 Interviews with name withheld, Kupang, 7 July and 4 November 2000.
32 Personal communication from Gerry van Klinken, 22 July 2009.
33 Interviews with name withheld, Kupang, 7 July and 4 November 2000.
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no one left free to report. For decades afterwards, very few people were will-
ing to even discuss the incidents (Aritonang and Steenbrink 2008:253-5).
On Solor, communism was linked to a local ‘cargo cult’, with PKI mem-
bers claiming that after the PKI took over there would be food for all as the 
party would dig out a local mountain, revealing a waterfall and sacks of rice. 
A large ship would also appear bringing further supplies of rice. Following 
G30S, 15 of the Solor communists were taken by the army to Larantuka on 
mainland Flores and beaten. They were then returned for punishment to their 
community, where they were beheaded. The villagers went further than this, 
however, and sought out another 15 ‘troublemakers’ who were also killed. 
These extra killings were not tolerated and some of the culprits were impris-
oned (Webb 1986:106-7).
The fate of those captured, but not killed
Not all those accused of connections with the PKI were killed. On Sumba, 
for example, some people with only peripheral connections to the PKI, such 
as having attended meetings, were dealt with by public beatings, sometimes 
while hung upside down. Others on Sumba were imprisoned, publicly vili-
fied, stripped, and beaten. One victim described how he and other accused 
PKI supporters were transported to what appeared to be a festival where they 
were beaten and exposed to the elements for two days and three nights (Kui-
pers 1998:87).
Wilson (1992:45-6) was told in the early 1970s that the Kefamenanu gaol 
in West Timor held 200 communists condemned to hard labour making 
bricks. Each evening they were given a lecture on the error of their ways. 
Such reports of imprisonments in no way negate the claim made by a former 
NTT parliamentarian that only about a dozen PKI suspects were convicted 
and imprisoned in NTT, as it is well established that thousands of suspects 
throughout Indonesia were imprisoned for years without trial. It is probable 
that many such people lingered in NTT gaols for years also, but how many, 
and for how long, is unknown.
As already noted, in south Belu a number of PKI activists were captured, 
interrogated, and executed. Others were killed without any preliminaries. 
There were also a great number of people in Belu associated with the PKI 
through their involvement with the ‘cargo cult’ led by makdok (traditional 
healer) Balthasar Klau. Klau claimed that through a great ceremony he would 
unite the spirit world with that of the living and there would then be no need 
to work and people would remain young forever. At the conclusion of the cer-
emony Klau would pilot a boat from the sea bringing to shore an abundance 
of goods. Klau paid for preparations for the ceremony from membership 
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fees he collected for co-operative organizations that he had established. New 
members were handed a PKI membership card. The ceremony was never 
held, however, as when news broke of the failed ‘coup’ in Jakarta Klau disap-
peared (Schaper 1984:28, 31).
Klau had fled with Fanus Pinai, the local BTI leader, to the district capital 
Atambua, where he was eventually arrested. Some time later the army issued 
a summons for all remaining south Belu PKI members to appear in Atambua. 
The wet season was well advanced and a great caravan of people trudged 
over 60 kilometres in the rain to reach the town. On arrival they were led to 
the crossroads in the middle of the town where the severed head of Balthasar 
Klau was displayed on top of a large petrol drum. The long procession was 
ushered around the drum and without further ado allowed to start the long 
journey home.34 It was certainly a dismal scene, but the south Belu PKI mem-
bers were fortunate compared to many others in NTT.
Who was targeted?
High-profile leaders and activists in the larger towns were the first ones tar-
geted in the action against the PKI in NTT, but lesser figures were soon sought 
out throughout the region and the latter must account for the majority of the 
victims. In the rural areas the PKI enjoyed popular appeal because of its land 
reform campaign and offers of food and goods to the poor. Several members 
of the GMIT were attracted to the PKI because of this and some were killed as 
a result, with at least one preacher, one parish teacher, and two church elders 
killed due to their PKI connections (Cooley 1976:347). Patty-Noach claims 
some simple villagers in West Timor who knew nothing of politics joined the 
PKI simply to take advantage of offers of food and goods, but later paid for 
them with their lives.35 In Rote’s Delha district scores of people were round-
ed up by the army and taken to the island’s main town, Baa. Many of these 
people were illiterate villagers whose only association with communism was 
knowing the words to a few NASAKOM songs. After intervention by the Raja 
of Delha most of them were set free, but the local PKI head and some others 
had already been executed.36 
34 Schaper 1984:56-7. Simon Schaper SVD was a minister of the Divine Word who spent many 
years in south Belu. The Schaper manuscript cited is held in the library of the Koninklijk Instituut 
voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (D H 11910). A brief account of Klau’s story is also provided in 
a book about the history of the Catholic Church in Indonesia (Schaper 1974:1323-6).
35 Interview with Maria Patty-Noach, Kupang, 30 June 2000. 
36 Interviews with names withheld by request, Nemberala, 28 November 2002.
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Many of those targeted in NTT were low-level government officials and 
schoolteachers.37 Tradesmen seem to have been targeted also as Wilson 
(1992:53) was told in Kupang that when basic services such as plumbing broke 
down it was difficult to have them repaired because most of the tradesmen 
had been communists and were killed following the ‘coup’. A former NTT 
parliamentary member who complains of the lack of lawful process at the time 
believes that many of those who were killed were not actual members of the 
PKI or its associated organizations, but had been ordered by their superiors 
to wear SOBSI badges or the like at some time, photographs of which were 
produced as ‘evidence’ of their ‘guilt’.38 Others killed may have only joined 
PKI-affiliated organizations due to familial pressure.39 It is possible that the 
figures for BTI membership, stated earlier, may have been compiled from lists 
of names of people who had received assistance from the BTI, most often in 
the form of free shovels. Many of these people may have later been killed, 
although they had no real connection to the group.40 The government official 
who pointed out the mass grave to Wilson (1992:49) near Kupang, volunteered 
that many of those killed had nothing to do with the PKI.
It is a widely-held belief that the killings in NTT were used as a screen to 
remove, for various reasons, people who had nothing at all to do with the 
PKI.41 As noted earlier, Chinese merchants are reported to have been killed on 
Rote merely to make up a quota, but it seems likely that there was a particular 
reason for those Chinese to have been targeted. Webb (1986:112) was told that 
some of the Chinese killed in West Timor were simply moneylenders who 
were liquidated with a view to clearing outstanding debts. The Chinese were 
clearly targeted, however, as the Pecinaan (Chinese quarter) that had existed 
in Kupang since the nineteenth century was completely destroyed. Temples 
and schools were closed, Chinese organizations were disbanded, and many 
of those not killed fled the city never to return (Julianus and Harzufri 2001). 
Tari (1972:289) claims that the Chinese schools had been owned by the 
government of the People’s Republic of China and were taken over by the 
Education Department. A Chinese Indonesian man interviewed in Kupang 
supported the latter claim, stating that the Chinese school in that town had 
been turned into a teacher’s college. He said, however, that the school had 
previously been run by a local Chinese association and had been returned to 
37 Interviews with Maria Patty-Noach, Kupang, 30 June 2000; and name withheld, Kupang, 7 
July and 4 November 2000.
38 Interview with Minggus Ratukore, Kupang, 7 July 2000.
39 Interview with former senior GMIT synod member, name withheld by request, Kupang, 3 
November 2000.
40 Personal communication from Gerry van Klinken, 22 July 2009.
41 Interview with former senior GMIT synod member, name withheld by request, Kupang, 3 
November 2000; Cooley 1976:347; Wilson 1992:49.
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the Chinese community in 2002 for use as a cultural centre. A new temple was 
being built on the outskirts of the town at that time as well, but as most mem-
bers of Kupang’s Chinese community had since become Christians it would 
also play more of a cultural role rather than a religious one.42 In many other 
parts of Indonesia the main Chinese targets following G30S were members of 
the PKI-affiliated Badan Permusyawaratan Kenegaraan Indonesia (Baperki, 
Indonesian Citizenship Consultatative Body), a socio-political organization 
that sought equality for all Indonesian citizens regardless of ethnic origin and 
demanded the cultural rights of the Chinese minority (Suryadinata 2001:504). 
Tari (1972:264), however, does not include Baperki in his list of PKI-affiliated 
groups operating in NTT and it is not mentioned in other sources, thus it is 
unknown whether it was active in NTT or not.
The case of Nitenel Ngoek in Kupang demonstrates the use of accusations 
of PKI membership for other purposes. Ngoek was in the middle of a land-
ownership dispute when the ‘coup’ occurred in Jakarta. On 3 February 1966 
he was detained by a mob including a policeman (brother of the plaintiff in 
the land dispute), which falsely accused him of PKI membership. Ngoek was 
forced aboard a truck that already contained 20 or more other people and was 
taken at high speed to the village Tarus, about two hours’ drive from Kupang. 
There the detainees’ names were read out from a list, one by one; they then 
re-boarded the truck and were driven off to be executed. Ngoek’s name, how-
ever, was not on the list. His guards told him that he was free, but that he had 
better run away as far as possible and not look back. Ngoek knew that if he 
returned home he would be killed, so when he arrived after much wandering 
in an isolated village he was glad to accept the villagers’ offer to stay. Ngoek 
remained in the village for over 30 years and only returned to Kupang after 
being discovered by some of his by-then adult children. Ngoek’s tale may be 
fabricated, but the details he relates, such as the names of all protagonists, and 
his request that his case be re-examined, lends it veracity. In late 2001 he was 
still trying to clear his name of any connection with the PKI (Keda 2001).
Non-PKI members who also suffered
Family members of those accused of PKI membership suffered much in NTT. 
The Ngoek family, for example, endured the scorn and avoidance of their 
neighbours for decades after the accusation made against Nitenel Ngoek in 
1966 (Keda 2001:41). Relatives of PKI members were often forced out of their 
jobs or found it difficult to get a job. One of the best-known cases in West 
Timor concerns the Markus family. Mikael Markus was a teacher and head 
42 Interview with Irwan Safari, Kupang, 16 December 2002.
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of the BTI in SoE. His son Octo was also a teacher and communist and both 
were killed following the ‘coup’. One of Markus’s daughters was a member of 
Gerwani and later spent many years in prison as a result. Another of Markus’s 
sons, however, was a respected staff member at Kupang’s state university, a 
Parkindo activist, and a known anti-communist. Nevertheless, when this J.F. 
Marcus was elected rektor (vice-chancellor) Jakarta would not ratify the ap-
pointment because of the family PKI connection.43
The wife of the Nunhila PKI branch head had tried to dissuade her hus-
band from joining the party, but he rejected her advice. Yet after her husband 
was arrested she was also taken into custody and accused of being the real 
‘communist brain’ in the family as she had been educated to senior high 
school level, whereas her husband had only attended primary school.44 She 
had been heavily pregnant when her husband was arrested and the child was 
born on 7 October 1965. The very next day she was taken to the police station. 
After four days of questioning she was loaded onto a truck with other women 
prisoners. She suspected they were to be killed and when the police wanted 
to take her baby from her she refused, saying ‘If you are going to kill me you 
should kill the baby also’. Perhaps this saved her life because she was later 
returned to the police station.45
No food was provided by the police and with an acute famine in West 
Timor at the time rice was expensive. Her parents could only afford to buy 
her rotten rice, which was made into cakes. She and her baby were constantly 
exposed to the elements and the child died soon after their release from cus-
tody. Later, she was kept under constant surveillance. She was sacked from 
her civil service job and told that she would never be allowed to work for the 
government again. It was very difficult with four young children to care for, 
but the situation improved when she got a job with a foreign company. She 
was even given the opportunity to travel abroad, but she was refused travel 
documents. In many ways she continued to suffer in silence; as her children 
grew up they disliked her to talk of the past, and if she raised the topic with 
others in Kupang they quickly changed the subject.46
The young man, mentioned earlier, who returned to Rote to visit his fam-
ily after many years living in the Netherlands found himself in a very dif-
ficult situation following G30S. Several members of his family had joined the 
43 Personal communication from Gerry van Klinken, 22 July 2009; and interviews with Maria 
Patty-Noach, Kupang, 30 June 2000; Benyamin Sahetapy Engel, Kupang, 2 November 2000; and 
former senior member GMIT Synod, name withheld by request, Kupang, 3 November 2000.
44 While of limited education he was a talented musician and artist, was a member of the PKI-
affiliated Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat (LEKRA, Institute of People’s Culture), and had attended 
an art course in East Germany.
45 Interviews with name withheld, Kupang, 7 July and 4 November 2000.
46 Interviews with name withheld, Kupang, 7 July and 4 November 2000.
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PKI and were killed not long after his return. He narrowly avoided capture 
himself. He fled to mainland Timor, but did not try to leave Indonesia as he 
feared capture at the border because of the family connection with the PKI. 
Finally, his Dutch passport expired and he was too scared to apply for a new 
one in case he was identified. He spent some time in Dili in East Timor, but 
later settled in Kupang. In the late 1990s he remained living as a fugitive and 
his apprehension of being connected with the PKI was compounded by a 
fear that his time in Dili would attract attention from Indonesian intelligence 
officers searching for members of the East Timorese resistance.47
Conclusion: continued action against PKI suspects and the recent situation in NTT
Although the killings in NTT seem to have ceased in the late 1960s, the re-
percussions of G30S continued to be felt for much longer. Wilson (1992:40-1, 
52-3) reports that in Kefamenanu in the early 1970s bells chimed each hour as 
patrols moved through the town – a hangover of the ‘previous troubles’, and 
in Kupang he was warned to avoid being caught out late at night as the armed 
six-man patrols were very alert, always questioning strangers.
The Udayana military command remained vigilant against the PKI and 
in mid-1967 declared it had uncovered the existence within its territory of a 
group known as PKI Malam (Night-time PKI) or PKI Gaya Baru (New Style 
PKI). As a result 184 soldiers and 122 civil officials were arrested that year. 
Several scores of PKI suspects were arrested in the following years, but the 
numbers reduced to a trickle in the course of time. Nevertheless, in April, 
May, and June 1977, the Udayana Territorial Military Commander issued 
orders to all under his command to increase their vigilance against any resur-
gence of PKI activity. The PKI Gaya Baru was said to be operational mainly 
in Bali and had been influenced by a movement begun in Blitar in East Java. 
There is, however, no indication that any of the arrests relating to PKI Gaya 
Baru were made in NTT.48
Despite having minimal ties to the PKI many people who were captured, 
but later released, such as those mentioned from Sumba and south Belu, 
continued to be viewed suspiciously and were required to report regularly to 
47 Name withheld, interviewed by Rob Goodfellow, Kupang, June 1997.
48 ABRI 1999:95-6. Reports of the PKI Gaya Baru make it appear to be a shadowy organization 
created by New Order propaganda in order to justify the regime’s repressive activities, but it was 
not entirely fictitious. For example, a decade-long rebellion in West Kalimantan led by the former 
head of the West Kalimantan PKI, Said Achmad Sofyan, was often attributed to PKI Gaya Baru. 
Sofyan was captured and killed in 1974 and military operations against the rebels were formally 
ended in 1976. Nevertheless, there were scattered reports of ‘communists’ being arrested in West 
Kalimantan throughout the 1980s (Davidson and Kammen 2002).
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the police for decades following G30S (Kuipers 1998:87; Schaper 1984:57). As 
many unsophisticated villagers who joined the PKI or its associated organi-
zations in NTT were killed, those who survived often felt that they had been 
tricked into joining by false promises or did not understand that they were 
joining an organization at the time. As a result, village people became wary 
of all organizations and would avoid any sort of membership. This reluc-
tance only began to ease in the early 2000s.49 The exception to this pattern 
was church membership. In 1965 a large proportion of the NTT population 
still adhered to their traditional animist beliefs. Following G30S, however, it 
became clear that the army considered all those who did not belong to one of 
the major recognized religions to be atheists and therefore communists. As a 
result tens of thousands of people rushed to renew their church membership 
or joined the church for the first time (Farram 2002:45).
Some people in NTT were accused of involvement with the PKI nearly 18 
years after the party had been banned. On Christmas Eve 1983 six primary 
school teachers in West Timor were informed that they were being removed 
from their positions as they had been involved in a banned political party 
(PKI). The issue became public in 2000 when the six teachers from Timor 
Tengah Selatan (TTS, South Central Timor) approached the district head, 
Bupati Willem Nope, seeking a reversal of the decision. Nope, however, 
claimed to have no power to reverse the decision and stated that in the 1970s 
and 1980s many civil servants, including teachers, were subject to administra-
tive sanctions and sackings due to their involvement in the PKI. The six teach-
ers took their complaint to the local head of the Department of Education and 
then to the office of the provincial governor, both without success. In June 2000 
the six teachers stated that they had sent their request for a review of their cases 
direct to the president, but the result of their appeal is not known (Ans 2000).
When the six TTS schoolteachers requested a review of their cases in 2000 
the situation was vastly different to that only a few years before. Soeharto, 
whose New Order regime had relied on the continued demonization of 
the PKI as part of its legitimacy, had stood down as president in May 1998. 
In October 1999 Abdurrahman Wahid became president and offered hope 
to those who had suffered under the previous regime by suggesting that 
restrictions against the PKI and its former members were no longer neces-
sary. Ultimately, however, those who had a vested interest in the continued 
suppression of the PKI, or who genuinely feared a resurgence of the party, 
ensured that laws banning the PKI were not repealed. 
In NTT some politicians have shown that they believe there is still political 
mileage to be made out of accusations against their opponents of PKI involve-
ment. While campaigning for elections in North Central Timor in 2004 a candi-
49 Interview with Maria Patty-Noach, Kupang, 30 June 2000.
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date and a Golkar official were reported as having suggested that a number of 
their opponents were in parties that accepted communist ideology. The parties 
targeted were Partai Sarikat Indonesia (PSI, United Indonesia Party), Partai 
Persatuan Daerah (PPD, United Regional Party), and Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa (PKB, National Awakening Party). Supporters of these parties were 
disturbed by the accusations which they felt might affect their candidates’ 
chances in the elections. The accusations led the official election monitoring 
body to issue a statement that former PKI members or their descendants could 
be involved in the parties concerned, as the law allowed, but that communism 
as a party ideology was prohibited, thus electors need have no fear of support-
ing communism when casting their votes (Nes 2004). What effect the accusa-
tions had on people’s voting preferences remains unknown.
In what may or not have been a related incident, it was reported in Kupang 
in March 2004 that posters with the initials ‘PKI’, the words ‘Partai Komunis 
Indonesia’, and the famous symbol of a hammer and sickle, were pasted on 
walls along three of the town’s main roads (including, perhaps significantly, 
Jalan Achmad Yani). The posters’ presence was reported to the police, who 
‘immediately went to the scene to tear them down before any more people 
could lay their eyes on the PKI symbol’. The matter was reported in the local 
press, along with a photograph of one of the offending posters (Aly/Rys 
2004; PKI pamphlets 2004).
The cases discussed show that fear of the PKI in NTT has continued into 
recent times. The final word on the PKI and the fear it has continued to engen-
der in the province is given here to Andreas Yohannes, a non-communist 
former government official, who told the writer that he was very thankful to 
Soeharto, as he believed that without him he would have been killed by the 
PKI. Yohannes also made what appeared a contradictory statement by claim-
ing that President Wahid’s proposal of reversing the ban on the PKI was not 
a bad idea. He then clarified his statement: if the PKI was legal, he said, we 
would then know who its supporters were and where to find them; unlike the 
present situation, where they are all hidden.50
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